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SERHii PlokHY
tHE CAll oF BlooD
Government propaganda and public response  
to the Soviet entry into World War ii
on thursday, September 7, 1939, as a shell-shocked Major Henryk Sucharski, 
the commander of the Polish garrison of Westerplatte, surrendered the embattled 
fortress to numerically superior German forces, and Hitler’s mechanized divisions 
rushed eastward, encircling Łódź, approaching Warsaw, and crossing the narew 
River, joseph Stalin summoned his military commanders to the kremlin. on the 
agenda was Soviet entry into the war, which had already become global. Among 
its declared participants were Germany, Poland, Britain, France, and South Africa. 
the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, signed only two weeks earlier with Stalin’s active 
participation, assigned parts of Poland east of the narew to the Soviet sphere of 
inluence, but the Soviet leaders were more than cautious about claiming their 
prospective booty. on September 5 Viacheslav Molotov, chairman of the uSSR 
Council of People’s Commissars and people’s commissar for international relations, 
responded evasively to the German appeal of two days earlier to send the Red 
Army into Poland, saying that the time was not yet ripe. now, with the Germans 
advancing, the Poles retreating, and the British and French doing little more than 
formally declaring war, Stalin wanted his military brass to speed up preparations 
for hostilities. the partial mobilization of reserves ordered the previous day was 
already taking effect. Soviet forces would cross the Polish border and seize the 
uSSR’s portion of war booty. But how to justify an act of open aggression against 
a neighboring state? 
Stalin had his answer ready. immediately after meeting with his commanders, 
he received in his Kremlin ofice the leader of the Communist International 
(Comintern), the Bulgarian communist Georgi Dimitrov. Also present were 
Viacheslav Molotov, the chief party propagandist, Andrei Zhdanov, and the 
chief Soviet representative in the Comintern, the ukrainian communist Dmytro 
Manuilsky. Stalin told his visitors that the Soviet union would take advantage of 
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the world conlict to help the capitalist countries exhaust one another. He shared 
none of the admiration lavished by earlier generations of revolutionaries on Poland, 
which he characterized as a fascist state that was oppressing fellow ukrainians and 
Belarusians. “the annihilation of that state under current conditions would mean 
one less bourgeois fascist state to contend with!” asserted Stalin. “What harm would 
result from the rout of Poland if we were to extend the socialist system to new 
territories and populations?” he asked his visitors, according to Dimitrov’s diary. 
one part of Stalin’s argument was based on a Bolshevik-style class analysis and the 
logic of world revolution that had failed to materialize in the 1920s. Another had to 
do with national minorities — the non-Polish inhabitants of eastern Poland, which 
had been “allocated” to the uSSR by the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. indeed, it was 
the ukrainian-Belarusian nationality card that would be used most broadly both at 
home and abroad as catchall justiication for Soviet aggression. It would outlive 
the early days of the conlict, serving as the basis of the Soviet authorities’ claim to 
their newly acquired territories until the end of the war.1
This essay looks into the development of the ethnic justiication of Soviet 
aggression against Poland on three levels: diplomatic, propagandistic, and popular. 
it examines how the theme of ethnic minorities developed in Soviet-German 
negotiations in the weeks leading up to Soviet entry into the war and the signing 
of the Soviet-German Boundary and Friendship treaty of September 28, 1939; 
discusses the use of the nationality card in Soviet domestic propaganda; and, inally, 
takes a close look at the impact of the nationality theme on Soviet public opinion. 
There are two questions of broader signiicance that I seek to engage in this essay. 
The irst deals with the relationship between Soviet foreign and domestic policy, 
especially with the formulation and articulation of nationality policy. the second 
concerns the variety of responses to government policy available to the Soviet public 
under Stalinism. i shall argue that 1) Stalin’s vacillation on the new Soviet borders 
and the propaganda effort accompanying the Soviet invasion of Poland demonstrate 
that the Soviet leader and his advisers were surprised by the German offer of 
August 23, 1939 to divide Poland into spheres of inluence/occupation and did 
not fully formulate their position on the scope of their territorial expansion until a 
month later, when the military campaign was all but over; 2) the Soviet authorities’ 
view of the world not only as a community of states but also as a conglomerate 
of nationalities, as well as their understanding of the principle of national self-
determination as possessing broad international legitimacy, had a profound impact 
on the formulation of Soviet foreign policy and deined the extent of Soviet territorial 
expansion in September 1939; 3) in the irst weeks of the war, changes in Soviet 
foreign policy led to a change in government rhetoric on the nationality question, 
also opening the door to subsequent changes in nationality policy; 4) the change of 
1. A.A. Chernobaev, ed., na prieme u Stalina: tetradi (zhurnaly) zapisei lits priniatykh 
i.V. Stalinym (1924-1953 gg.), (M., 2008), 272–273; Dokumenty vneshnei politiki SSSR, 
vol. 22, bk. 2 (M., 1992), 25–28; Mykola lytvyn, kim naumenko, Stalin i Zakhidna ukraïna, 
1939-41 (kyiv, 2010), 10–12; ivo Banac, ed., the Diary of Georgi Dimitrov (new Haven, 
2003), 115-116.
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nationality rhetoric helped the regime co-opt a sector of public opinion previously 
hostile to its policies both at home and abroad and prompted some segments of the 
Soviet public to formulate their relation to government policy in a way that does not 
it the categories of resistance and compliance, which have received considerable 
attention in the recent literature on the subject. 
the geopolitical crossword
three days after Stalin’s conversation with the Comintern leaders, one of the 
participants in the meeting, Viacheslav Molotov, was ordered to try the nationality 
argument for Soviet entry into the war on none other than the German ambassador 
to the Soviet union, Friedrich Werner von der Schulenburg. on September 10, 
1939, after telling Schulenburg that “the Soviet Government was taken completely 
by surprise by the unexpectedly rapid German military successes” and needed 
more time to prepare its own army for the invasion, Molotov mentioned to him a 
possible justiication for the Soviet Union’s prospective invasion of Poland. “[T]he 
Soviet Government,” wrote Schulenburg, reporting the words of the Soviet foreign 
commissar to Berlin, “had intended to take the occasion of the further advance of 
German troops to declare that Poland was falling apart and that it was necessary 
for the Soviet Union, in consequence, to come to the aid of the Ukrainians and 
the White Russians ‘threatened’ by Germany. this argument was to make the 
intervention of the Soviet union plausible to the masses and at the same time avoid 
giving the Soviet union the appearance of an aggressor.”2 
the class analysis and export-of-revolution argument given by Stalin to 
Dimitrov had been dropped in Molotov’s presentation to Schulenburg, while the 
nationality justiication had survived, admittedly in somewhat different form. 
it was no longer the Polish state’s poor treatment of the ukrainians and Belarusians 
but their possible mistreatment by the Germans that was supposed to justify the 
Soviet invasion. on September 14, Schulenburg reported to Berlin about his next 
meeting with Molotov. the Soviet foreign commissar was again preoccupied 
with the question of legitimacy. “For the political motivation of Soviet action (the 
collapse of Poland and protection of Russian ‘minorities’) it was of the greatest 
importance not to take action until the governmental center of Poland, the city of 
Warsaw, had fallen,” reported Schulenburg on the new Soviet position. “Molotov 
therefore asked that he be informed as nearly as possible as to when the capture of 
Warsaw could be counted on.” 
to be sure, the Soviets were not simply awaiting the fall of Warsaw. they began 
to prepare their own population for war, and the ethnic explanation of the impending 
invasion played an important role. on September 8, the day after Stalin’s meeting 
2. Schulenburg to the German Foreign office, September 10, 1939, in Raymond james Sontag 
and james Stuart Beddie, eds., nazi-Soviet Relations, 1939–1941: Documents from the 
Archives of the German Foreign office (Washington, 1948): 91.
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with his military commanders and Dimitrov, the Polish military attaché in Moscow 
attended a public lecture in Gorky Park on the German-Polish war. the speaker 
asked whether his audience was prepared to observe impassively the sufferings 
inlicted by nobiliary Poland on Ukrainians and Belarusians. The audience 
responded with cries of “March, march on the evil Germans!” on September 11, 
the Red Army formed two fronts tasked with the invasion of Poland. they were 
based on the kyiv and Minsk military districts but received “nationalized” names 
— ukrainian and Belarusian. they also introduced the minorities theme in the 
public propaganda. A few days later it appeared in the print media. Schulenburg 
concluded his report of September 14 by stating: “i would direct your attention to 
today’s article in Pravda, carried by DnB [Deutsches nachrichtenbüro — German 
Press Agency], which will be followed by a similar article in izvestiia tomorrow. 
the articles serve [to prepare] the political motivation mentioned by Molotov for 
Soviet intervention.”3
the two articles mentioned by Schulenburg ascribed the defeat of Poland to 
its mistreatment of its ethnic minorities and provided detailed information on the 
sorry status of ukrainians and Belarusians in the prewar Polish state. the potential 
German threat was not mentioned, but Ribbentrop inally became alert to the 
problem that might arise as a result of Molotov’s desire to explain Soviet action 
against Poland by pointing a inger at the Germans. To forestall it, Ribbentrop 
wanted a joint Soviet-German statement stressing the desire of the two powers 
to “restore peace” in Poland. on September 15 the Reichskommissar cabled his 
ambassador in Moscow: 
We assume… that the Soviet Government has already given up the idea, 
expressed by Molotov in an earlier conversation with you, of taking the 
threat to the ukrainian and White Russian populations by Germany as 
a ground for Soviet action. the assignment of a motive of that sort would be out of the question in practice. It would be directly contrary to the true German intentions, which are conined exclusively to the realization of 
well-known German spheres of interest. it would also be in contradiction to the arrangements made in Moscow and, inally, would — in opposition to the 
desire for friendly relations expressed on both sides —expose the two States 
before the whole world as enemies.4 
When Schulenburg presented these arguments to Molotov at their meeting on 
September 16, the day before the Soviet invasion of Poland, the Soviet commissar 
found himself on the defensive. Despite Ribbentrop’s warning, he insisted on 
3. Schulenburg to the German Foreign office, September 14, 1939, nazi-Soviet Relations, 92–93; Czesław Grzelak, ed., Wrzesień 1939 na kresach w relacjach (Warsaw, 1999), 41-42; 
natalija liebediewa, “Wrzesień 1939 r.: Polska między niemcami a Związkiem Sowieckim,” in Sławomir Dębski and Michail narinski, eds., kryzys 1939 roku w interpretacjach polskich i rosyjskich historyków (Warsaw, 2009), 437-475, here 447-448.
4. “o vnutrennikh prichinakh porazheniia Pol´shi,” Pravda (14 September 1939): 1; Ribbentrop 
to Schulenburg, September 15, 1939, nazi-Soviet Relations, 94.
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including a statement in the Soviet declaration on the causes of intervention 
arguing that 
the Soviet union considered itself obligated to intervene to protect its ukrainian 
and White Russian brothers and make it possible for these unfortunate people to 
work in peace. 
According to Schulenburg’s report, Molotov 
conceded that the projected argument of the Soviet Government contained 
a note that was jarring to German sensibilities but asked that in view of the dificult situation of the Soviet Government we not let a trile like this stand in 
our way. the Soviet Government unfortunately saw no possibility of any other 
motivation, since the Soviet union had thus far not concerned itself about the 
plight of its minorities in Poland and had to justify abroad, in some way or other, 
its present intervention.5
As always, Molotov was acting on Stalin’s instructions and was not at liberty to 
change anything in the declared position of the Soviet government. His superior, 
however, took Schulenburg’s warning very seriously. At 2:00 a.m. on September 17 
Stalin summoned the German ambassador to the kremlin not only to tell him that 
the Red Army was about to attack Poland but also to read him the note to the same 
effect that would be given to the Polish ambassador. “the draft read to me contained 
three points unacceptable to us,” reported Schulenburg to Berlin. “in answer to my 
objections, Stalin with the utmost readiness so altered the text that the note now 
seems satisfactory for us.” the note, which appeared in Soviet newspapers the next 
day, presented the defense of the ukrainians and Belarusians as the main reason for 
the Soviet intervention, with no mention of a German threat. the relevant parts of 
the note were included almost verbatim in Molotov’s address to the Soviet people, 
which was broadcast by radio a few hours after the invasion. in both cases, the 
ukrainians and Belarusians were simply declared to have been left unprotected by 
the collapse of the Polish state.6 
the main problem with their explanation of the invasion as an act of fraternal 
assistance to the ukrainians and Belarusians was that, according to the secret 
protocol signed by Molotov and Ribbentrop in Moscow on the morning of August 24, 
1939 (and dated the previous day), the Soviet sphere of inluence extended beyond 
territories settled predominantly by ukrainians and Belarusians. the Soviet catch 
also included millions of jews and Poles. if jews were dispersed all over Polish 
territory, nowhere constituting a majority and consequently unable to claim a 
5. Schulenburg to the German Foreign office, September 16, 1939, nazi-Soviet Relations, 95.
6. “Rech´ po radio predsedatelia Soveta narodnykh komissarov SSSR tov.V.M. Molotova 
17 sentiabria 1939 g.,” Pravda (18 September 1939): 1; “nota pravitel´stva SSSR, vruchennaia 
pol´skomu poslu v Moskve utrom 17 sentiabria 1939 goda,” ibid.; Schulenburg to the German 
Foreign office, September 17, 1939, nazi-Soviet Relations, 96.
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homeland of their own, the Poles had such a claim. they constituted an absolute 
majority of the population on the territories between the Buh and Vistula rivers that 
were to be forcibly brought into the Soviet sphere. Well aware of this, Stalin made 
preparations for dealing with the Polish question. On the eve of the invasion, the 
commander of the newly formed ukrainian front, Semen tymoshenko, received 
instructions on how to facilitate the election of deputies to three popular assemblies 
— those of western ukraine, western Belarus, and Polish regions east of the Vistula. 
These assemblies were to adopt resolutions requesting the incorporation of their 
territories into the uSSR. Western Belarus and Western ukraine would thereby join 
the existing Belarusian and ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republics, while the Polish 
territories would join the uSSR as a separate Polish Soviet Socialist Republic. on 
September 15 lavrentii Beriia, the people’s commissar of internal affairs (nkVD), 
included a reference to the Polish assembly in the order he sent his subordinates in 
Ukraine and Belarus. The orders relected current thinking at the very top of the 
Soviet pyramid of power.7 
Beriia’s instructions to NKVD oficers in Ukraine and Belarus and the 
instructions to tymoshenko show that on the eve of the Soviet invasion Stalin had 
no plans for creating a Polish buffer state between Germany and the uSSR, an idea 
earlier entertained by the Soviet leadership. on September 19, Molotov said as 
much to Schulenburg, who reported to Berlin on his conversation with the Soviet 
foreign commissar: “Molotov hinted that the original inclination entertained by 
the Soviet Government and Stalin personally to permit the existence of a residual 
Poland had given way to the inclination to partition Poland along the nissa-narew-
Vistula-San Line.” That was the line deined by the secret protocol of the Molotov-
Ribbentrop Pact of August 23. Within the next few days, Stalin further developed 
his thinking on the issue. on September 25 he told Schulenburg that he wanted 
to avoid “anything that in the future might create friction between Germany and 
the Soviet union” and “considered it wrong to leave an independent Polish rump 
state.” According to Schulenburg, Stalin proposed the following: 
From the territory to the east of the demarcation line, all the Province of lublin 
and that portion of the Province of Warsaw which extends to the Bug should be 
added to our share. in return, we should waive our claim to lithuania.8 
What was the logic of Stalin’s new proposal? His desire to claim lithuania might 
suggest that he wanted to regain a former Romanov possession. Besides, by 
swapping Polish territories for lithuanian ones, Stalin straightened the line of his 
7. V. kovaliuk, “novi arkhivni dokumenty pro narodni zbory Zakhidnoï ukraïny (zhovten´ 
1939 r.),” Arkhivy ukraïny, no. 5-6 (1991): 88; Radians´ki orhany derzhavnoï bezpeky u 
1939-chervni 1941 r. Dokumenty HAD SBu ukraïny, comp. Vasyl´ Danylenko and Serhii 
kokin (kyiv, 2009), 46-49, here 48.
8. Schulenburg to the German Foreign office, September 20, 1939, nazi-Soviet Relations, 
101; Ribbentrop to Schulenburg, September 23, 1939, ibid., 102; Schulenburg to the German 
Foreign office, September 25, 1939, ibid., 102-103.
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future defenses, moving the border farther away from leningrad and eliminating 
the bulge in the south along the future western borders of ukraine and Belarus. 
that is as far as the lithuanian argument takes us, but Stalin’s offer of the lublin 
and Warsaw provinces to Germany clearly does not it such an explanation, as 
those territories had largely belonged to the Russian Empire prior to 1917. Besides, 
Stalin was not willing to pass on the former Habsburg Galicia, which fell into 
the Soviet sphere of inluence even though German representatives had expressed 
interest in the region in unoficial talks with the Soviet ambassador in Berlin in 
july 1939. if the proposal was not solely an attempt to reclaim tsarist possessions 
or improve military defenses, what was it? A close reading indicates that the Soviet 
desire to recover lost territory and improve the geostrategic position of the state 
were adjusted to take into account ethnic boundaries and national identities of 
borderland populations. By getting rid of the ethnic Polish territories, Stalin was 
also bringing the new Soviet-German border into line with his propaganda thesis 
that Soviet forces had entered Poland primarily in order to liberate their fellow 
ukrainians and Belarusians. He could thus explain the new border to the Soviet and 
foreign public much more effectively than the original one.9 
there is also no reason to doubt the sincerity of Stalin’s claim that he wanted to 
avoid anything in the new territorial arrangement that might make future German-
Soviet relations more dificult. Getting rid of the Polish buffer state was one step in 
that direction. Getting rid of the lublin and Warsaw provinces, settled largely by 
Poles, was another. Stalin had good reason for concern that Germany might use the 
cause of Polish reuniication as a pretext to interfere in Soviet affairs and eventually 
go to war against the Soviet union. A few months earlier, the world press had been 
full of suggestions that Hitler was going to use transcarpathian ukraine — the 
Czechoslovak province of Ruthenia — as a base for starting a war with Stalin for 
control of Soviet ukraine. in March 1939 Stalin declared from the podium of the 
Eighteenth Party Congress that he did not trust Western insinuations in that regard. 
Many regard Stalin’s assertion as a signal to Hitler and Ribbentrop that he was 
prepared to make a deal. the deal he was negotiating now precluded the creation 
of a new “transcarpathia,” either ukrainian or Polish. the proposed new Soviet-
German boundary was to follow the Sian and Buh rivers, roughly corresponding to 
the ethnic boundary in the region as deined by the Allied Supreme Council in Paris 
in December 1918, later known as the Curzon line.10
9. on the German interest in Galicia, see Michael jabara Carley, 1939: the Alliance that 
never Was and the Coming of World War ii (Chicago, 1999), 192-193.
10. A new York times correspondent reported from Paris on September 17: “Some people 
here think that Russia intends to take that part of Poland that was offered to her in the plan for settlement of Marquess Curzon of Kedleston. This went to a considerable distance west 
of the Soviet’s present legal border. then, it is presumed, the Russians would declare that 
they had a logical basis to claim this territory on the ground that even so extreme an opponent 
of the Bolsheviki as lord Curzon had been willing to concede the Soviet’s right to it.” See 
Harold Denny, “Paris Sees Stalin in Betrayer Role,” new York times (September 18, 1939): 6. 
the london times published a map of Poland including the Curzon line and the new Soviet-
German boundary in its issue for September 18, 1939. on the origins of the Curzon line, 
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On September 28 Joachim von Ribbentrop, who had lown to Moscow the previous 
day, signed the German-Soviet border agreement, which recognized the new line 
proposed by Stalin. In the course of negotiations, Ribbentrop tried to acquire the 
oil-rich Drohobych region of Ukrainian Galicia for Germany, but Stalin stood irm, 
agreeing to ship oil to Germany but not to give up the territory. He emerged from 
the negotiations not only as a protector of ukrainian territory but also as a leader 
concerned about ukrainians and Belarusians beyond the territories that were about 
to become part of the USSR. Molotov and Ribbentrop signed a conidential protocol 
that committed the Soviet government to raise no obstacle to the voluntary transfer 
of German inhabitants from the Soviet sector of partitioned Poland to the German 
sector. the German government promised to reciprocate with regard to ukrainians 
and Belarusians. this privilege was not extended to Poles or jews. Another protocol 
obliged each government to suppress Polish propaganda directed against the other 
party. in transferring Polish territories to Hitler, Stalin wanted to ensure that his new 
partner would not use the Polish card against the uSSR.11
if the map accompanying the secret protocol of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact 
(August 23, 1939) was largely the result of proposals made by Ribbentrop, the 
amendments made to it on September 28 originated with Stalin. Ribbentrop’s 
proposal was based mainly on historical precedent and on the assumption that Stalin 
wanted to restore the old imperial borders in Eastern Europe. Stalin’s amendments, 
by contrast, were based on ethnic criteria that dominated the thinking of the post-
World War i era. in a mere three weeks — a brief period extremely rich in events 
and decisions — Stalin’s nationality argument, which was irst formulated, as far 
as we know, at his meeting of September 7 with Molotov, Zhdanov, Dimitrov, 
and Manuilsky, had developed from a theme intended to undermine the legitimacy 
of the Polish state into a propaganda tool and, inally, an important principle for 
determining the extent of Soviet territorial expansion and establishing the border 
with the Soviets’ new German neighbor. Stalin’s uncertainty with regard to 
that border and his vacillation between creating a Polish buffer state, setting up 
a Polish Soviet Socialist Republic as part of the uSSR, and transferring Polish 
territory to Germany indicate that he and his advisers were caught unprepared, 
irst by the conclusion of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact and then by the rapid 
advance of the German panzer divisions into Poland. it was in the process of the 
September consultations and negotiations with Germany that they found a way not 
only to sort out their messy territorial relations with Germany but also to work 
out a language in which they could explain their actions both at home and abroad. 
see jerzy Borzecki, the Soviet-Polish Peace of 1921 and the Creation of interwar Europe 
(new Haven, 2008), 79-104. on the significance of Stalin’s speech at the Eighteenth Congress 
of the Communist Party, see Donald Cameron Watt, How War Came: the immediate origins 
of the Second World War (new York, 1989), 110-111.
11. See ingeborg Fleischhauer, “the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact: the German Version,” 
international Affairs (Moscow) 37, 8 (August 1991): 114129; For the texts of the documents 
signed by Ribbentrop and Molotov in the early hours of September 29 (but dated the previous 
day), see nazi-Soviet Relations, 105-109.
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the word “nationality” proved highly compatible with the words “borders,” 
“security,” “legitimacy,” and “propaganda,” linking them in a diplomatic crossword 
that preoccupied Stalin in the weeks leading up to the Soviet entry into World War ii. 
Soviet propaganda
of the two partners who signed the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact in August 1939, it 
was the Soviets who were most concerned about its possible impact on public 
opinion in their country. When on the morning of August 24 Ribbentrop became 
too enthusiastic about the prospects of German-Soviet friendship, Stalin cautioned 
his guest with reference to public opinion. 
Do you not think we have to pay a little more attention to public opinion in our 
two countries? [he asked the nazi visitor]. For many years now we have been 
pouring buckets of shit over each other’s heads and our propaganda boys could 
not do enough in that direction. now all of a sudden, are we to make our peoples 
believe all is forgotten and forgiven? things do not work so fast. 
Stalin knew what he was talking about. When news of the pact broke in Germany, 
many in the nazi leadership blamed Ribbentrop for betraying party principles 
by making common cause with the Bolsheviks. While most ordinary Germans 
eventually overcame the original shock and accepted the pact as a means of 
avoiding war on two fronts, many nazi Party members found their deeply held 
anticommunist beliefs traduced. Some expressed their concerns to Hitler; others 
resigned from the party in protest.12 
news of the sudden about-face in Soviet-German relations left the population 
of the uSSR no less bewildered than that of Germany. People did not dare to 
resign from the Communist Party or voice their dissatisfaction publicly, but the 
nkVD registered mass disillusionment among the population, which had been 
fed for years on antifascist propaganda. Nikita Khrushchev, then irst secretary of 
the Central Committee of the Communist Party of ukraine, later remembered the 
embarrassment caused by the pact: 
We could not even discuss the treaty at party meetings. For us to have explained 
our reasons for signing the treaty in straightforward newspaper language would 
have been offensive, and besides nobody would believe us. it was very hard 
for us — as communists, as antifascists, as people unalterably opposed to the 
philosophical and political position of the fascists — to accept the idea of joining forces with Germany. It was dificult enough for us to accept this paradox 
ourselves. it would have been impossible to explain it to the man on the street. 
12. For Stalin’s remark to Ribbentrop, see Simon Sebag Montefiore, Stalin: the Court of 
the Red tsar (new York, 2003), 311. on negative reaction to the pact among the nazi anti-
Bolshevik core, see ian kershaw, Hitler, 1936-45: nemesis (london, 2000), 205-206.
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Molotov admitted the problem caused by the Soviet public’s reception of the pact 
in his speech to the Supreme Soviet on August 31. now the regime was faced 
with the task of explaining an even more treacherous move — the invasion of a 
neighboring state that had resisted a fascist attack.13
the Soviet use of the nationality issue to justify the invasion of Poland began in 
earnest with a publication in Pravda for September 14 that attracted the attention of 
Schulenburg and was picked up by the German Press Agency (DnB). it was in fact 
an editorial entitled “on the internal Reasons for the Defeat of Poland.” With regard 
to the fresh German victories on the Polish front, the editorial said: “it is hard to 
explain such a swift defeat of Poland solely by the superiority of Germany’s military 
technology and military organization and the absence of effective assistance to 
Poland on the part of England and France.” it was an implicit reference to an article 
that had appeared in Pravda only three days earlier. on September 11, in an essay 
entitled “the German-Polish War: A Survey of Military operations,” E. Sosnin 
enumerated four reasons for the collapse of Polish defenses: lack of fortiications on 
the country’s western borders, German superiority in air power, the Wehrmacht’s 
superiority in artillery, and lack of support from Poland’s Western allies. now 
the Soviet leaders were making an important corrective to Sosnin’s assessment. 
the editorial stressed the “internal weaknesses and contradictions of the Polish 
state.” it stated that 
Poland is a multi-ethnic state. in the composition of the population of Poland, 
Poles make up only 60 percent, while the other 40 percent are made up of national minorities, mainly Ukrainians, Belarusians, and Jews. It sufices to note 
that there are no fewer than eight million ukrainians in Poland, and about three 
million Belarusians.
the jews thus were relegated to the secondary status. the editorial was really about 
the ukrainians and Belarusians.14
the problem with the Polish state, according to the Pravda editorial, was not 
simply its multinational character but the way in which the Polish ruling circles 
treated their minorities — the subject broached by Stalin in his conversation with 
Dimitrov a week earlier. 
Western ukraine and Western Belarus, wrote Pravda, regions of predominantly Ukrainian and Belarusian population, are the objects of the most lagrant, 
shameless exploitation on the part of the Polish landlords. the situation of the 
ukrainians and Belarusians is characterized by a regime of ethnic oppression 
13. khrushchev Remembers, introduction, commentary and notes by Edward Crankshaw, 
trans. and ed. Strobe talbott (new York, 1971), 133; Viacheslav Molotov, Soviet Peace Policy: 
Four Speeches (london, 1941), 16. For nkVD reports on public reaction to the Molotov-
Ribbentrop Pact and Molotov’s speech at a session of the uSSR Supreme Soviet explaining the 
reasons for signing, see Radians´ki orhany derzhavnoï bezpeky, 968-985.
14. “o vnutrennikh prichinakh porazheniia Pol´shi.” Cf. E. Sosnin, “Germano-pol´skaia voina 
(obzor voennykh deistvii),” Pravda (11 September 1939): 4. 
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and lack of rights. The ruling circles of Poland, launting their supposed love of 
liberty, have done all they could to turn Western ukraine and Western Belarus 
into a colony without rights, consigned for plunder to the Polish lords. 
the authors of the editorial went on to describe in detail the discrimination of the 
non-Polish nationalities on the legal and administrative levels. Special attention 
was paid to the sorry state of ukrainian and Belarusian culture and the Polonization 
of the minorities. While the editorial allegedly dealt with the reasons for Poland’s 
defeat, its implicit message was hard to miss: the ukrainians and Belarusians were 
suffering under Polish rule and needed Soviet protection.15
The political signiicance of the editorial was not lost on foreign observers, and 
Schulenburg was not the only one to take note of it. With the beneit of hindsight, 
time magazine (September 25) linked the Pravda editorial with the panic that 
Stalin and Molotov must have felt as they watched the German advance into 
Poland. in an article entitled “Dizziness from Success,” which reminded the reader 
of Stalin’s piece of 1930 about excesses in the collectivization of agriculture, the 
time magazine writer argued that the editorial had been drafted by Stalin himself. 
“As the Germans reached Bialystok last week Comrade Stalin came out with his 
answer,” went the article. the time magazine author quoted liberally from the 
Pravda editorial on the mistreatment of ukrainians and Belarusians and concluded 
with the following statement: “thus with great circumspection the Dictator told 
the people what part of Poland Russia intended to get — i.e., the Polish ukraine, 
the northeast area south of lithuania.” in general terms, the argument used by 
the Pravda editorial was already familiar to observers of the European scene. 
Czechoslovakia had been dismembered in 1938-1939, ostensibly to guarantee 
the rights and freedoms of minorities. the mistreatment of the German minority 
in Poland had served as a pretext for Hitler’s attack on Poland only two weeks 
earlier, and Hitler had no qualms about exploiting Ukrainian nationalists either in 
Carpatho-ukraine or in Poland to destabilize the situation and achieve his goals. 
if anything, Stalin was now taking a leaf from Hitler’s book.16
When Viacheslav Molotov addressed the Soviet people on the radio in the 
late morning of September 17, explaining why the country had entered the war, 
the nationality question was front and center in his argument. The Soviet foreign 
commissar began by claiming that the Polish state had collapsed, rendering 
existing treaties between Moscow and Warsaw invalid. the collapse of Poland 
had also created a vacuum on the borders of the uSSR, threatening the security 
of the Soviet state. 
the Soviet government, continued Molotov, also cannot be expected to take an 
indifferent attitude to the fate of its blood relatives, ukrainians and Belarusians 
residing in Poland who previously found themselves in the position of nations 
15. “o vnutrennikh prichinakh porazheniia Pol´shi.” 
16. “Russia: Dizziness from Success,” time (September 25): 1939. 
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without rights and have now been completely abandoned to the vagaries of fate. 
the Soviet government regards it as a sacred obligation to extend a helping hand 
to its brethren ukrainians and brethren Belarusians residing in Poland.
The importance of this ethnic justiication of the invasion was further stressed in a 
statement later in the speech: 
the Soviet government has directed the General Staff of the Red Army to order 
its troops to cross the border and take the lives and property of the population of 
Western ukraine and Western Belarus under its protection.
the “blood brothers,” it seemed, had to be saved from the Polish government, even 
though it allegedly did not exist. there was no mention of the German threat or, for 
that matter, of the jewish minority in Poland. the former had been edited out of 
the text of the Soviet note to the Poles by Schulenburg. Reference to the latter was 
probably omitted by the Soviets themselves.17
While lamenting the fate of national minorities was nothing new in European 
politics of the day, the Pravda editorial of September 14 and Molotov’s speech 
of September 17 marked a major change in the Soviet use of nationality rhetoric 
at home and abroad. it was a shift from treating cross-border national minorities 
as a threat to the security of the Soviet union to a rhetoric that allowed the regime 
to take advantage of those communities not only to advance Soviet interests in the 
international arena but also to extend Soviet borders at the expense of neighboring 
states. in a certain way it was a return to the policies of the 1920s, marked by the 
original optimism of the new communist regime, which had not yet abandoned its 
dreams of world revolution. The policies of the 1920s, deined by Terry Martin 
as the “Piedmont principle,” were designed to “exploit cross-border ethnic ties to 
project political inluence into neighboring states.” They were irst formulated and 
promoted by the ukrainian national communists who wanted Soviet ukraine to 
serve as a beacon of hope for ukrainians in Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Romania. 
ukrainians abroad, went the argument, would be attracted to socialism and the 
USSR by the lowering of Ukrainian culture and society in Soviet Ukraine. This 
policy was ended during the Great Famine of 1932-1933, which resulted in millions 
of innocent deaths. the beacon was extinguished. ukrainian communists were 
accused of nationalist deviation and instigation of peasant resistance to the Soviet 
regime. the policy of cultural ukrainization was curtailed and the “Piedmont 
principle” nulliied.18 
the new era became known for a different set of foreign-policy priorities 
and a different rhetoric that relected a “besieged fortress” mentality. Ukraine 
and Belarus were now viewed as bulwarks of the Soviet state that were 
17. “Rech´ po radio predsedatelia Soveta narodnykh komissarov SSSR tov. V.M. Molotova.”
18. See terry Martin, the Affirmative Action Empire: nations and nationalism in the Soviet 
union, 1923-1939 (ithaca – london, 2001), 8-9, 225-227, 292-293, 312-319, 351-352.
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threatened by the capitalist West. the imperialists, argued the regime, were 
trying to exploit cross-border ethnic ties to spur non-Russian nationalism in the 
Soviet borderlands and create a ifth column in the USSR so as to prepare for a 
future invasion. the task of turning ukraine into a “true fortress of the uSSR” 
was formulated by Stalin himself in the months leading up to the Great Famine. 
Moscow’s representatives in ukraine were eager to oblige. “Comrades,” said 
the newly appointed irst secretary of the Communist Party of Ukraine, Nikita 
khrushchev, to delegates at the party congress in june 1938, “we shall bend 
every effort to ensure that the task and directive of the Central Committee of 
the All-union Communist Party (Bolshevik) and Comrade Stalin — to make 
Ukraine a fortress impregnable to enemies — is fulilled with honor.” Khrushchev 
blamed the “dificulties that Ukraine underwent in the course of collectivization” 
— an indirect reference to the Great Famine — on the intrigues of the foreign 
enemies of the USSR, including Józef Piłsudski of Poland. Khrushchev’s other 
references to Poland were intended to illustrate Soviet achievements in education 
and assert that the ukrainian toiling masses would never tolerate the rule of the 
Polish lords. the rhetoric was defensive rather than offensive. the “Piedmont 
principle” was long gone. the “besieged fortress” mentality remained dominant 
until the appearance of the Pravda editorial on September 14 and Molotov’s 
speech three days later.19
Molotov’s speech was broadcast on Soviet radio at 11:30 a.m. on 17 September, 
less than seven hours after the two Red Army fronts crossed the Polish-Soviet 
border and began their offensive against dispersed and disoriented Polish 
troops. Since the broadcast was scheduled to coincide with the lunch break at 
government institutions, factories, and collective farms, hundreds of thousands 
of industrial and ofice workers, peasants, and students all over the Soviet Union 
gathered around radio transmitters to listen the speech. they then participated in 
government-sponsored meetings featuring speakers who recapitulated Molotov’s 
statements made a few minutes earlier and called on those present to give their 
full support to the newest party policy and the war effort. the next day Pravda 
published a photo of a meeting attended by thousands at the Red Proletarian 
machine-tool factory in Moscow. it also ran an article on a gathering of professors 
and students of Moscow State university, reportedly with an attendance of six 
thousand, who welcomed the address delivered by a professor of party history, 
Vladimir Yudovsky. the professor characterized the invasion as “a sage act of 
world-historical signiicance.”20
in kyiv, the capital of ukraine, Pravda correspondents registered an especially 
high level of political activity and rising popular enthusiasm. “thousands of 
19. See joseph Stalin to lazar kaganovich, August 11, 1932, in oleg khlevniuk et al., eds., 
Stalin i kaganovich: Perepiska, 1931-1936 (M., 2001), no. 248; “iz otchetnogo doklada 
pervogo sekretaria tsk kP(b)u n.S. khrushcheva XiV s´´ezdu kP(b)u,” in V.iu. Vasil´ev, 
R.iu. Podkur, kh. kuromiia, iu.i. Shapoval, and A. Vainer, comp., Politicheskoe rukovodstvo 
ukrainy 1938-1989 (M., 2006), 35-47.
20. “Akt vsemirno istoricheskogo znacheniia,” Pravda (18 September 1939): 2.
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Kyivans crowded around transmitters on streets and squares,” reported Pravda 
from the capital of a republic directly affected by the invasion and the change in the 
party’s nationality rhetoric. 
With strained attention, they listen everywhere to the speech of Comrade 
V.M. Molotov. When Comrade Molotov speaks of the Soviet government’s 
decision to offer assistance to ukrainian and Belarusian brethren, stormy 
applause and shouts of “hurrah” resound. Comrade Molotov’s words are 
lost in cries of “long live Stalin!” “long live the Party!” “long live the 
Red Army!” Someone intones the proletarian hymn, and its sound carries 
far along the streets. in those minutes, two hundred draftees at the Stalin quarter recruitment ofice raised a fervent ovation in honor of the party and 
government. A meeting sprang up spontaneously. Someone took a red towel 
from a table, and in the hands of a draftee it turns into a scarlet banner under 
which the draftees swear to do their duty with honor to their homeland and to 
the proletariat of the whole world.21
Pravda and other Soviet newspapers were full of reports on public meetings at 
which workers, peasants, and representatives of the Soviet intelligentsia were 
encouraged by the regime to express their support for the intervention. Given the 
oficial nature of these meetings, it is not surprising that the language used by 
speakers and authors of resolutions was taken directly from Molotov’s speech and 
other oficial pronouncements. Emphasis was placed on the national liberation 
of ukrainians and Belarusians and the social liberation of the entire population of 
Poland’s eastern provinces. Rhetoric that had characterized the “besieged fortress” 
mentality was abandoned almost overnight in favor of the language of national 
(and social) liberation. not only was the fortress no longer besieged, but its walls 
were extended westward, necessitating a new terminology. the “national liberation” 
paradigm it the bill. The Soviet authorities’ claim that they had entered the war on 
behalf of their Slavic blood brothers, abandoned by their erstwhile Polish rulers, 
had limited impact on world opinion at best. 
if one judges by Soviet media reports, Stalin and Molotov scored a major 
public-relations coup. But should one trust reporting in the Soviet media? 
the london times wrote on September 18 regarding the events of the previous day 
in Moscow: 
At 8 o’clock the Russian wireless broadcast a summary of the contents of the 
note [to the Polish government], which stated that Soviet action was necessary 
to safeguard her own interests and to protect the White Russian and ukrainian 
minorities in Eastern Poland. […] it has been noted that the Soviet arguments 
bear a family resemblance to those invariably adopted by Hitler and as often 
demolished by the Soviet Press as pretexts for aggression. Accordingly, it was 
a bewildered Soviet population which listened to M. Molotoff’s broadcast 
this morning.
21. “krasnaia armiia neset schast´e narodu,” Pravda (18 September 1939): 3.
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G.E.R. Gedye, the new York times Moscow correspondent, reported on 
September 17 from the Soviet capital: 
[t]he Moscow population, recalling the reiterated declarations of leaders headed 
by joseph Stalin that they did not desire a foot of anyone else’s territory, went 
about today asking: “What has happened now?” “Are we at war; with whom and 
why?” “What do we want in Poland?” “What has gone wrong with the neutrality 
pact signed with the express purpose of keeping us from war?”22 
in the West, the Red Army’s invasion of Poland was considered a stab in the back of 
a victim of nazi aggression. Even politicians like Winston Churchill in Britain, who 
gave limited support to the Soviet action, did so on the basis of arguments different 
from those invoked by Stalin and Molotov. But what was the impact of national-
liberation rhetoric at home? Did it work, or did it fail? To answer this question, one 
has to deal with the dificult task of assessing Soviet public opinion. In the last few 
decades, popular attitudes toward international politics and, in particular, questions 
of war and peace have attracted a fair amount of attention from scholars of the 
Second World War. Public opinion was an important factor in the formulation of 
foreign policy by democratic governments and an important consideration in the 
efforts of dictatorial regimes to mobilize public support for warfare. the Soviet 
union certainly falls into the latter category, which creates additional problems in 
the acquisition and assessment of relevant data. It is dificult but not impossible to 
track major trends in the mood of the population under dictatorial regimes, partly 
because the regimes themselves allocated signiicant resources to monitoring those 
trends and changes.23
the nkVD pollsters
throughout Soviet history, the Communist Party leadership regularly received 
top-secret reports assessing the attitudes of the Soviet public to party policies. 
the reports came from two sources: party organs and the secret police. Whatever 
the circumstances, both types of reports always stated that the vast majority of the 
22. “Red Army in Polish territory. Molotoff excuses Soviet action. Protection of ‘blood-
relations.’ A stab in the back,” the times (September 18, 1939): 6; G.E.R. Gedye, “Soviet 
‘neutrality’ Stressed in Move. Moscow Assures other States on invasion — Molotoff Gives 
talk to Bewildered People,” new York times, (September 18, 1939): 1.
23. Carley, 1939: the Alliance that never Was, 216–26. on the relation between ideology 
and realpolitik in Stalin’s foreign policy of the period, see Amir Weiner, “Saving Private 
ivan: From What, Why, and How?” kritika 1, 2 (Spring 2000): 305-336, here 309-313. For 
research on public opinion during World War ii, see Sarah Davies, Soviet Public opinion in 
Stalin’s Russia: terror, Propaganda and Dissent (Cambridge, 1997); Steven Casey, Cautious 
Crusade: Franklin D. Roosevelt, American Public opinion, and the War against nazi Germany 
(new York, 2001); Daniel Hucker, Public opinion and the End of Appeasement in Britain and 
France (Farnham, uk, 2011). 
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Soviet people welcomed, accepted, and endorsed the latest initiatives, thereby 
echoing newspaper coverage of those events. they then turned to the opinions of 
those who were doubtful of party policies or expressed opinions characterized as 
blatantly anti-Soviet. in that regard, both types of reports differed profoundly from 
the Soviet media. the party reports tended to give less coverage of anti-Soviet 
activities, while the secret-police reports largely focused on just such activities. 
there was good reason for the difference. Emphasizing negative responses would 
not be in the interest of party oficials preparing the reports, since it could be 
interpreted as an indication of deiciencies in their own propaganda efforts. 
Secret-police oficials, on the other hand, could only beneit from focusing on 
negative responses. Dealing with existing or imagined opposition to the regime 
was the raison d’être of the secret police, and the reports provided, among other 
things, additional justiication for maintaining an extensive and costly secret-
police apparatus.24
the credibility of secret-police reports was at the core of the discussion about 
compliance and resistance under Stalinism in the irst issue of kritika (2000).25 
There is good reason to question the reliability of the information included in the 
reports, especially when they are mined exclusively for manifestations of opposition 
to the regime. there seems to be general agreement, however, that when it comes 
to “negative” statements — those critical of government policy — they certainly 
cannot be regarded as expressions of the only authentic feelings of the population but 
can be used to assess the range of responses offered by the Soviet public to a given 
initiative on the part of the Soviet state. But what about expressions of support for 
the regime and its actions? Should they be taken at face value or ignored? one way 
to deal with this question is to distinguish between two kinds of the endorsements 
of oficial policy — those expressed in Bolshevik parlance of the period and those 
that did not mirror oficial pronouncements. Expressions of approval for Soviet 
entry into the war that used a vocabulary different from that of party declarations 
and media reports are of special interest. An added beneit of focusing on such 
expressions is the possibility of identifying sources of support for government 
policy beyond the party’s own organizational base. the unexpected change of 
rhetoric in the Soviet media’s justiication of the coming military campaign is a 
case in which such a strategy may be applied to good effect. 
i shall try to reconstruct the variety of positive and negative responses to the 
Soviet invasion of Poland on the basis of thirty-three reports about the reaction 
of the Soviet public to the outbreak of the war iled by oficials of the People’s 
Commissariat of internal Affairs of ukraine between August 27 and october 15, 
24. on the peculiarities of Soviet secret-police reports as a historical source concerning the 
state of public opinion, see Davies, Soviet Public opinion in Stalin’s Russia, 9-14.
25. See jochen Hellbeck’s exchange with Sarah Davies in the reprint of the kritika polemics: 
Michael David-Fox, ed., the Resistance Debate in Russian and Soviet History, (Bloomington, 
2003). For the continuation of the debate, see Hiroaki kuromiya, “How Do We know What the 
People thought under Stalin?” in timo Vihavainen, ed., Sovetskaia vlast´ —narodnaia vlast´? 
(SPb., 2003), 1-16.
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1939. these reports have only recently become available to scholars as part of 
a publication project undertaken by historians from the institute of ukrainian 
Archaeography in kyiv in cooperation with archivists of the Security Service of 
ukraine, and with the support of a number of German governmental and public 
institutions. Most of the reports were prepared for Nikita Khrushchev, then irst 
secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of ukraine, and for 
lavrentii Beriia, people’s commissar of internal affairs of the uSSR, by the people’s 
commissar of internal affairs, ivan Serov, and his deputy, Mykola Horlynsky. 
they were based in part on reports that Serov and his assistants were receiving from 
the various regions of Ukraine and from NKVD oficials in Red Army units posted 
in ukraine. these, too, are included in our analysis.26 
on September 17, the date of the Soviet invasion of Poland and Molotov’s speech 
to the Soviet people, Mykola Horlynsky sent an urgent request to his subordinates: 
i propose that all heads of operational sections of the nkVD of the uSSR 
with a secret service and intelligence in kyiv present secret-service reports on 
the reaction of the population to Comrade Molotov’s speech on the entry of our 
forces into Poland to the head of the Second Department of the nkVD of 
the uSSR by 2:00 p.m. today. thereafter draft versions of such reports are to be 
presented to Comrade Pavlychev every three hours. 
By the end of the day, Horlynsky had iled two reports assessing the mood of the 
Ukrainian population for Nikita Khrushchev. The irst was based on the reactions 
of kyivans, while the second was a follow-up memo including data telephoned to 
Kyiv from NKVD ofices in the regions. Two more reports followed on the next day, 
and reporting continued on a regular basis until the very end of the campaign.27 
What did the people of Soviet ukraine think about the war? to begin answering 
this question, I shall present a spectrum of both “positive” and “negative” 
responses without trying to establish how popular they may have been among the 
Soviet ukrainian public in September 1939. in general, the nkVD reports agreed 
with the Soviet media, claiming that oficial efforts to convince the population 
of the legitimacy of government action had been largely successful. “A number of 
passages of Comrade Molotov’s speech were accompanied by applause,” wrote 
Mykola Horlynsky on September 17. the reaction of students was particularly 
enthusiastic. “At kyiv university, Comrade Molotov’s speech was met with shouts 
of ‘hurrah’ by students,” reads the report. the following report suggested that 
young people in the provinces were just as enthusiastic: “A number of incidents 
have been noted of voluntary reporting to military recruitment ofices, with requests 
for enlistment in the ranks of the RkkA [Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Army]. 
A group of students of the Mykolaiv Pedagogical institute made a collective appeal 
to be enlisted as volunteers in the Red Army.” While rank-and-ile NKVD agents 
26. Radians´ki orhany derzhavnoï bezpeky, nos. 431-456, 998-1073.
27. ibid., 49.
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and their superiors were under pressure not only to ind and record but also to 
fabricate positive responses to Communist Party initiatives, the episodes described 
above could hardly have been fabricated, as they were easily veriiable.28
What aroused such enthusiasm on the part of students? the information about 
Mykolaiv students volunteering for the Red Army was preceded in Horlynsky’s 
report by the statement that “the action of the uSSR is being assessed as a step 
in the direction of starting a world revolution and active struggle against the 
fascist aggressors.” A student of the Vinnytsia Medical institute named Benadsky 
allegedly told an nkVD informer that “our Soviet government will have to bear 
the red banner of revolution farther west. the defeat of Poland shows that one of the 
links of fascism has been broken.” one might assume that the new crop of Soviet 
youth, born after 1917 and raised on notions of revolutionary romanticism, was 
welcoming an opportunity to follow in the footsteps of participants in the october 
Revolution and heroes of the Spanish Civil War, lionized by Soviet propaganda, in 
order to carry the torch of revolution to Central and Western Europe. the references 
to “fascist aggressors” and “the breaking of one of the links of fascism” echo Soviet 
anti-fascist propaganda of the years leading up to the conclusion of the Molotov-
Ribbentrop Pact, which disappointed and disheartened idealistically inclined Soviet 
students. it appears that the students were prepared to see the Soviet invasion of 
Poland as a reversal of the policy initiated by the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact.29 
the report forwarded by Horlynsky to lavrentii Beriia on September 19, included 
information from the regions indicating that not only students but also young 
workers and peasants were eager to take part in the war. in the city of osypenko 
(present-day Berdiansk), “immediately after Comrade Molotov’s radio address, 
eighty men presented themselves, twenty of them with their wives, and asked that 
they be directed to the Red Army to take part in military operations.” Recruits in the 
Chernihivka region of Zaporizhia oblast “began to demand their speedy enlistment 
in the army so that they might be in time to take part in military operations together 
with the whole Red Army.” it was not entirely clear to the population whether the 
Soviet troops would simply occupy Western ukraine and Belarus without military 
action, ight the Poles, or engage the German army as well. R.P. Sheiner, the author 
of a letter intercepted by the nkVD, anticipated a war with Germany. “We had to 
take this action,” he wrote about the invasion of Poland, “for the Germans would 
have attacked us in any event, so it is better to strike them on Polish territory than 
on ours.” Some Red Army oficers crossing the Polish border on the morning of 
September 17 believed that they were going to ight the Germans. “I thought that 
this was the beginning of war with Germany,” remembered one of them later, “and 
many other oficers thought the same.”30 
28. ibid., 998, 1001.
29. ibid., 995, 1001, 1054.
30. ibid., 1009-1011, 1015, 1049; Harvard university, Widener library, the Harvard Project 
on the Soviet Social System, Schedule B, vol. 6, case 193, 4.
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Most of the initial criticism to the Soviet invasion of Poland recorded by nkVD 
agents came from the ranks of the intelligentsia. Svitozor Drahomanov, the son 
of Ukraine’s most inluential political thinker of the nineteenth century, Mykhailo 
Drahomanov, and a translator at the Art Publishing House in kyiv, allegedly stated 
in the presence of an nkVD informer: 
in essence, this is the fourth partition of Poland, carried out by arrangement 
between Stalin and Hitler. […] All that is going on may be called the victory of 
Hitlerism, which is the highest stage of the development of capitalist society.
Drahomanov expressed his critique of oficial actions in language borrowed 
from recent Soviet propaganda and Vladimir lenin’s writings on the nature 
of imperialism. He was not the only one to attack the regime from the standpoint of 
Marxist orthodoxy and anti-fascism. A graduate student at the institute of Folklore 
of the ukrainian Academy of Sciences named lanovy reportedly declared in the 
presence of a government informer: 
And what will the whole world say? they will say that we are dividing Poland 
together with fascist Germany. England and France will declare war on us, which means that we will be ighting them together with Germany. What will 
the Western communists and the workers of the world say then?31
the sudden u-turn embodied in the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact certainly undermined 
the Soviet regime’s credibility among many of its international and domestic 
supporters. For years the regime had attacked fascist Germany as the main threat to 
peace, prepared the population for a possible alliance with the Western democracies, 
and placed heavy propaganda emphasis on communist and proletarian solidarity 
in the world-wide ight against fascism. The USSR was at the forefront of that 
struggle — the greatest hope of all peace-loving peoples. now all that was suddenly 
over. in the eyes of those Soviet citizens who linked the pact with the invasion of 
Poland, the regime stood condemned of complete disregard for its own political 
and ideological commitments. the Soviet union was now making a mockery of 
its peace-loving rhetoric, becoming an aggressor, and betraying not only Britain 
and France but also its communist allies in the West — such were the themes 
of “negative” responses recorded by nkVD agents. there was also a good deal of 
criticism of the government’s action from the viewpoint of realpolitik. quite a few 
people from a variety of social backgrounds believed that Hitler would outsmart 
the Soviet leadership and eventually start a war with the uSSR. these sentiments, 
widespread in ukraine, were shared by many inhabitants of leningrad, as indicated 
by the research of Sarah Davies.32 
31. Radians´ki orhany derzhavnoï bezpeky, 999.
32. See Davies, Soviet Public opinion in Stalin’s Russia, 97-99.
312 SERHii PlokHY
the apparent hypocrisy of the Soviet regime also drew strong criticism from 
students, who were the most enthusiastic supporters of the regime. “the shift in our 
policy has been too abrupt,” said a student from kyiv named Rybchinsky. “only a 
month ago we were proposing assistance to Poland against the aggressor, and now 
we are condemning it at every turn and have even taken over part of its territory.” 
Some students resorted to irony. “our papers cast fascism and Hitler in the darkest 
colors. now it turns out that those were all lies. Hitler is conducting the war in most 
humane fashion; he is not devastating the population or cultural treasures,” said a 
student of the Kyiv Construction Institute named Velednytsky. Also questioned 
was the social component of the Soviet liberation paradigm. “it would have been 
better not to liberate the people of Western ukraine and Western Belarus from the 
lords’ oppression, for things are no better among us. they will feel that in a while,” 
opined the medical student Gomerbarg. Even the least controversial claim, that 
of fraternal ties with the peoples of the newly occupied territories, was ridiculed. 
“it is very strange to hear assertions about our brethren in the West,” said the kyiv 
student Zalizniak. “now we call them brothers, but if that brother had written you a 
letter earlier, you would have suffered for it.” true believers from the ranks of the 
Red Army could also be quite critical. They were dissatisied that their commanders 
had canceled a sharpshooting exercise known as “Shooting the fascist.”33 
During the irst few days of the invasion, Horlynsky reported to his superiors 
that there were no negative responses recorded among workers. nor were there any 
reactions, either positive or critical, attributed to peasants in the reports. But soon 
reports began to arrive from the regions, and while they also focused largely on 
critical opinions attributed to the intelligentsia, there were growing references to 
critical statements by workers and peasants alike. Some of these repeated arguments 
noted in reports on the mood of the intelligentsia, but there were also new themes 
and arguments. their underlying motives were protest against economic hardship, 
refusal to ight for Soviet rule in case of a German-Soviet conlict, and readiness 
to exploit the war in order to settle scores with the regime. A worker from odesa 
named tsukanov allegedly said in the presence of an nkVD informer: 
Hitler is attacking Poland and will go on to attack our communists. the war is 
only a few days old, and we already have nothing. 
A peasant named Hustovydyn in Sumy province allegedly tried to disrupt a meeting 
on the occasion of Molotov’s speech, saying, 
the Soviet government has stripped me bare and reduced me to poverty. not a 
single idiot will go to the front.
33. Radians´ki orhany derzhavnoï bezpeky, 1055; Vladyslav Hrynevych and oleksandr 
lysenko, “ukraïna na pochatkovomu etapi Druhoï Svitovoï viiny,” in ukraïna: politychna 
istoriia, XX-pochatok XXi stolittia (kyiv, 2007), 675.
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kalynychenko, a peasant from kirovohrad province, told his fellow collective 
farmers: 
the war will solve everything. We suffered for a long time; now there is less 
time to wait. Soon we will live without collectives. 
His attitude was shared by another peasant named krosalo, who stated: 
Even if the Germans take us over, we will be none the worse for that. on the 
collective farm, you are still hungry and threadbare. in 1933, Soviet power was 
guilty of starving many people to death.34
We cannot assess the popularity of either positive or critical opinions among the 
Soviet public presented in the nkVD reports. Many objects of nkVD surveillance 
managed to survive into the late 1930s precisely because they were able to keep 
their mouths shut or make neutral or pro-Soviet pronouncements when they 
suspected that they were dealing with an nkVD informer. A 48-year-old ukrainian 
woman who came from a dekulakized family and worked on the Soviet railroads 
commented as follows to interviewers of the Harvard Refugee interview Project:
[G]enerally, people in the Soviet union worked hard and were silent; they were 
afraid to talk too much or to ask for some information because of the common 
terror and because many Soviet agents and spies were among the people. 
Especially former ‘kulaks,’ people like my husband and me, were silent and 
worked hard. 
Whether genuine or not, both positive and negative statements contained elements 
of people’s real thinking, not constructed for the sake of the informer.35
What we do know, both from the reports and from other sources, is that resentment 
among the peasantry based on the outcomes of collectivization and the Great Famine 
of 1932-1933 was an ongoing concern, and that the urban population, including that 
of Moscow, leningrad, and capitals of the republics, suffered from shortages of 
food and manufactured goods that grew worse in August and September 1939. the 
public was generally confused by the recently signed Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, not 
understanding on which side, if any, the Soviet union was entering the war. Some 
of the people “polled” by the nkVD were concerned about what Britain and France 
would say regarding the Soviet invasion of an independent and embattled state. 
34. Radians´ki orhany derzhavnoï bezpeky, 1012, 1018, 1021, 1032.
35. like many others interviewed by the Harvard Project, this particular interviewee did not 
trust the Soviet media. She stated in that regard: “i read the newspapers very rarely because 
i knew that in the newspapers there was only Soviet propaganda.” See Harvard university, 
Widener library, the Harvard Project on the Soviet Social System, Schedule A, vol. 34, case 
148/(nY) 1398, 30. 
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the nationality card
the nkVD reports divided Soviet citizens into a number of categories, most 
notably class/social status and nationality. judging by these reports, the strongest 
anti-Soviet statements were expressed by peasants and members of “other 
nationalities,” which, according to the nkVD, generally meant Poles and Germans. 
Among the social groups, it was the intelligentsia, not the peasants or workers, 
that received most attention. if workers and collective farmers were allotted one 
category each, the intelligentsia had two: many reports included separate sections 
on “ofice workers and intelligentsia” and “academic circles.” The special interest 
of NKVD oficials in the opinions of the intelligentsia was also relected in the 
number of statements quoted in NKVD reports. The sections on the intelligentsia 
were two to four times longer than those on the working class or collective farmers. 
Some members of the intelligentsia quoted in the reports were under surveillance 
as part of ongoing investigations into the activities of illegal political organizations. 
Such people were already surrounded by informants, and it was relatively easy for 
nkVD agents to obtain information about their attitudes. judging by the reports, 
it was the intelligentsia that provided the most sophisticated appraisal of changes 
in Soviet foreign policy, and it was the same group that reacted most actively to 
the dramatic change in Soviet nationality discourse on the eve and in the course of 
the Soviet invasion of Poland.
What was the intelligentsia’s reaction to the changes in party rhetoric? if one 
trusts the nkVD reports, it was overwhelmingly positive. if one looks at statements 
and comments that did not relect Molotov’s address and media pronouncements, 
it appears that the national-liberation theme did indeed strike a chord with the 
intelligentsia. It was interpreted in two ways. The irst was the old imperial view 
that regarded ukrainians and Belarusians as part of a greater Russian nation 
and thus as Russians; their liberation meant the reuniication of the Russian people 
and the return of the imperial borderlands to Russian control. the second approach 
was closer to the oficial government line, as it postulated the liberation and 
uniication not of the Russian people but of the Ukrainian and Belarusian lands 
and peoples. Both approaches, the old imperial and the new national one, were 
reinforced by the class interpretation expressed in the oficial pronouncements: the 
Russians (alternatively, the ukrainians and Belarusians) were to be liberated not 
only from national but also from social oppression. 
the sentiments of those who subscribed to the old imperial vision of the Russian 
state and nation but were prepared to adapt it to the new oficial terminology were 
expressed by a professor of the kyiv medical school named Romankevych, who 
allegedly stated in the presence of an nkBD informer: “the Soviet union should 
restore the Russian lands — the kholm region, Western ukraine, and Western 
Belarus.” A worker from odesa named liubchenko went even further in his claim 
to the lost imperial territories. “the Soviet government has acted properly,” he 
said to an informer. “Western ukraine and Belarus are settled by our people and 
constitute our territory. We should restore Bessarabia — it is ours too, after all.” 
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the treatment of Western ukraine and Western Belarus as lands settled by “our 
people” was quite common in statements recorded by the NKVD, as were calls 
for the annexation of Bessarabia, the former imperial province that was annexed 
by Romania in the aftermath of the 1917 revolution and allocated to the Soviet 
sphere of inluence by the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. Interestingly enough, all these 
statements were quoted in the sections of reports devoted to positive responses. 
they were certainly in keeping with the notions of ethnicity held by the authors of 
the reports, who assigned the responses of ukrainians and Russians to the sections 
on social categories but dealt with the reactions of “Galicians”—that is, ukrainians 
who came from Galicia, formerly under the rule of Austria-Hungary — in the 
sections entitled “Among other nationalities.”36
the old imperial interpretation of the invasion of Poland recorded in nkVD 
reports from ukraine was apparently popular in Russia as well. G.E.R. Gedye 
reported for new York times from Moscow on September 18: 
Privately, some confess confusion as to how the invasion is to be reconciled 
with joseph Stalin’s declaration that he did not want a foot of others’ territory. 
others again rationalize this casuistically, saying, “But, of course, this was ours, 
inhabited by our kin, and torn from us by Poland in 1920.” 
the academician Vladimir Vernadsky, one of the leaders of the Constitutional 
Democratic Party in the Russian Empire, the irst president of the Ukrainian 
Academy of Sciences in 1918, and a major igure in the USSR Academy of Sciences 
in Moscow at the start of World War ii, belonged to the latter group. He recorded 
in his diary for october 3: 
the seizure of (Western) ukraine and Belarus is approved by all. the course 
of history is amazingly spontaneous. the Poles are crazy. And the Czechs 
(incomparably milder in that regard) have also suffered because of it. But the 
policy of Stalin and Molotov is realistic and, it seems to me, correct — a Russian 
policy of state. in Poland, social revolution is a military force. 
Vernadsky considered the takeover of Western ukraine and Belarus a manifestation 
of Russian policy and apparently had no problem with Stalin’s export of revolution 
to Poland. His views were shared by other members of the all-union Academy. 
on october 18 Vernadsky wrote that his colleague, the geochemist Aleksandr 
Fersman, was “constantly under the inluence of the takeover of Ukr[aine]—a 
Russian policy.”37
36. Radians’ki orhany derzhavnoï bezpeky, 1001, 1011, 1047, 1060.
37. G.E.R. Gedye, “Moscow outlines Polish Partition,” new York times, September 19, 1939, 
1, 5; V.P. Volkov, ed., V.i. Vernadskii, Dnevniki, 1935-1941, 2 vols. (M., 2006), 2: 56, 67. on 
the revival of Russian national themes on the official and popular levels in the years leading up 
to World War ii, see David Brandenberger, national Bolshevism: Stalinist Mass Culture and the 
Formation of Modern Russian national identity, 1931-1956 (Cambridge, MA, 2002), 43-114.
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if intellectuals in Moscow saw the Soviet invasion of Poland as a manifestation 
of Russian policy, most of their colleagues in ukraine interpreted it as evidence of 
the regime’s ukrainian policy. on october 19, Vernadsky recorded in his diary a 
summary of his discussions with leonid Yasnopolsky, a member of the ukrainian 
Academy of Sciences who had moved to Moscow in 1931. 
Yasnopolsky, wrote Vernadsky, apparently like the overwhelming majority of those who ind themselves here, sympathizes with Stalin’s policy. Not so 
much because of the Germans as because of the restoration of the country’s political signiicance and the ‘liberation’ of the Ukrainians and Belarusians 
from Poland. 
Vernadsky’s observations on Yasnopolsky’s views are echoed by the nkVD reports 
sent to nikita khrushchev and lavrentii Beria from ukraine in September-october 
1939. if one trusts those reports, most kyiv academics subscribed to the modern, 
“ukrainian” interpretation of the national- and social-liberation paradigm.38 
Very few leading Ukrainian intellectuals refused to be swayed by oficial 
propaganda about beneits to the Ukrainian nation. Among the most critical was the 
renowned ukrainian poet Maksym Rylsky, who was regarded by the nkVD as a 
ukrainian nationalist. Rylsky argued that the invasion of Poland 
runs counter to the humanity and justice about which we have always made so 
much noise. [He continued:] And so i write verses every day praising the valiant 
Soviet forces and the wisdom of our policy, but there is no enthusiasm in my 
heart. We attacked the weak, after all, and it is very hard for an honest poet to 
justify such an action. 
the authorities refused to grant Rylsky permission to visit Western ukraine in the 
fall of 1939. His opinion was shared by other ukrainian writers. Semen Skliarenko 
told an nkVD informer: 
in our time, you cannot believe anyone or anything. the strong falls upon the 
weak — that is an eternal law of life. just yesterday we shouted that the Germans 
were barbarians, plunderers, and scoundrels, but now we are almost trading 
kisses with them. Such striking hypocrisy.39
if ukrainian writers and poets were troubled by the injustice of the invasion 
and the duplicity of Soviet foreign policy and propaganda, academics took a 
much more forgiving attitude toward the regime. Some of them were genuinely 
excited about the new turn of events. Professor Mykola Hrinchenko of the 
38. Vernadskii, Dnevniki, 1935-1941, 2: 68.
39. Radians´ki orhany derzhavnoï bezpeky, 1030.
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institute of Folklore at the ukrainian Academy of Sciences allegedly told 
his colleagues: 
i do not know whether there is any other foreign-policy measure of the 
Soviet authorities capable of arousing such joy among ukrainians as this one. 
ukrainians have reason to rejoice. 
Hrinchenko explained his excitement by noting that, with the Soviet takeover of 
eastern Poland, “the age-old hopes of the people of Western ukraine, starving 
and suffering under the Polish yoke, have come true.” it was a politically correct 
explanation of the enthusiasm generated by the realization of the principal goal 
of Ukrainian irredentism — the uniication of the Ukrainian lands, to which the 
ukrainian national movement had aspired since the latter half of the nineteenth 
century. Similar ideas were expressed by other ukrainian intellectuals. An analysis 
of responses to the Soviet invasion of Poland recorded by nkVD agents in 
ukraine allows one to conclude that the regime’s use of national-liberation rhetoric 
to justify its entry into World War ii succeeded in extending its power base and 
co-opting dissenting views by appropriating nationalist discourse and presenting 
itself to society as a benefactor of the national cause. By and large, the ukrainian 
intelligentsia was prepared to follow the government’s lead in regarding the Red 
Army’s invasion of Poland as a campaign of national liberation and uniication of 
their native land, and not as their country’s entry into global military conlict.40
Conclusions
the Soviet leadership’s decision to justify its attack on Poland by invoking the 
liberation of that country’s ukrainian and Belarusian minorities helped mobilize 
support for the Soviet entry into World War ii not only among those of its citizens 
who considered the Red Army’s invasion of Poland justiied in geostrategic and 
military terms, or were eager to promote world revolution, but also among those 
who considered it a just restoration of the old Russian imperial boundaries, a step 
toward the reuniication of the Russian people and, last but not least, the uniication 
of the ukrainian and Belarusian nations. the broadening of popular support for 
Soviet foreign policy thus beneited the regime at a time when deteriorating 
economic conditions and a falling standard of living coincided with a sharp turn of 
Soviet propaganda away from its established anti-fascist attitude, which increased 
the number of critics of the regime.
An examination of the NKVD reports makes it quite clear that the Soviet people 
were not limited to clear-cut compliance or resistance in their dealings with the 
Soviet state under Stalinism. they were not merely “objects” of state policy but 
“subjects” in their own right who used their “subjectivity” not only to embrace 
40. ibid., 998-999, 1021-1022.
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the regime or learn how to “speak Bolshevik” in order to survive but also to lend 
or withdraw support from the state, depending on its policies. that was certainly 
true in the 1920s, and it appears to have been true for the late 1930s as well. 
the dictatorial state remained concerned about the attitudes of the population, 
classiied along social and national lines. As the reaction of Ukrainian intellectuals 
to the Soviet invasion of Poland demonstrates, representatives of individual peoples 
were prepared to lend conditional support to the regime if it offered the realization 
of their objectives in return. the initiative came from the state, but it was ultimately 
up to the particular group to accept or reject the government’s offer. Besides, it was 
the members of ukrainian intelligentsia who prepared historical, demographic, and 
other data on the newly acquired territories for the Soviet government and were 
thus in a position to inluence the oficial position on a variety of issues. It is easy 
to assume that lengthy presentations to nkVD agents by the intellectuals under 
their surveillance were intended not only as manifestations of loyalty but also as 
attempts to inluence party policy. 
the Soviet regime had co-opted national-liberation discourse and policies in the 
1920s. it embarked on a policy of co-opting Russian public opinion in the 1930s. 
now it used similar tactics to co-opt those battered by its policies of the 1930s — the 
ukrainian and Belarusian intellectual elites. unlike in the 1920s, the government was 
prepared to offer them not only concessions at home but also opportunities abroad. 
the introduction of the ethnic theme into Soviet foreign-policy pronouncements 
initiated a change in Soviet nationality policy, documented in the ukrainian case by 
the studies of Serhy Yekelchyk and Vladyslav Hrynevych. it was an obvious case 
in which foreign-policy considerations led to a shift in nationality policy at home. 
if the “Piedmont principle,” as terry Martin has argued, was seen by the authorities 
as “an exploitable beneit of a domestically driven policy,” and the “besieged 
fortress” mentality arguably relected the regime’s domestic and foreign-policy 
concerns alike, the “national-liberation” paradigm was formulated and implemented 
irst and foremost in response to foreign-policy considerations. We see no attempt 
on the part of Soviet oficials to employ national-liberation rhetoric or implement 
related policies either at home or abroad before the Stalin-Dimitrov meeting of 
September 7, 1939.41
Adopted quite unexpectedly in a desperate attempt to ind justiication for the 
coming aggression, the new national-liberation paradigm turned out to be a useful 
tool for the Soviet government in the course of World War ii. it helped mobilize 
support for Soviet entry into the war in September 1939. For the next two years 
it helped promote the Sovietization of Western ukraine, Western Belarus and, in 
1940-1941, Bessarabia and Bukovyna. it also helped the Soviet leadership reclaim 
those territories in 1944-1945. At the Yalta Conference in February 1945, neither 
President Roosevelt nor Prime Minister Churchill was able to refute Stalin’s claims 
41. Martin, Affirmative Action Empire, 9; Serhy Yekelchyk, Stalin’s Empire of Memory: 
Russian-ukrainian Relations in the Soviet Historical imagination (toronto, 2004), 13-62; 
Vladyslav Hrynevych, “Viina z Hitlerivs´koiu nimechchynoiu (1941–1945),” in ukraïna: 
politychna istoriia, 736-756.
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to lviv and Drohobych, which were presented in ethnonational terms. it was only 
with the start of the Cold War that the Soviet authorities were forced to abandon 
the national-liberation paradigm. once again, as in the 1930s, ethnic contacts began 
to be regarded not as an opportunity to export Soviet inluence abroad but as a 
channel through which the imperialist powers could corrupt the Soviet nationalities. 
From the late 1940s on, campaigns were launched against local nationalism, 
and contacts with cross-border ethnic communities and diasporas were severely 
curtailed. once again, as in the 1930s, diasporas and compatriots abroad were 
condemned as enemies of the Soviet state and people.42 
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